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Abstract
Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior
explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law
and on the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domi-
ciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Del-
aware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a lingua
franca for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation deci-
sions of 1,850 venture-capitalist-backed start-ups, we find evidence consistent
with this lingua franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua franca effect appears to be
more important than other factors that have been shown to influence corporate
domicile, such as corporate law flexibility and the quality of a state's judiciary.
Our study contributes to the literature on the market for corporate charters by
providing evidence that Delaware's continued dominance is in part due to in-
vestors' familiarity with its corporate law.
1. Introduction
Delaware dominates the corporate- chartering market in the United States-it is
the only state that attracts a significant number of out-of-state incorporations.'
For helpful comments on this project, we are grateful to Michael Alexeev, Lucian Bebchuk, Ola
Bengtsson, Steven Davidoff, Victor Fleischer, Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausner, Eric Rasmusen,
Larry Ribstein, Xuan Tian, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Indiana University,
the University of Notre Dame, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Southern California,
the Transactional Law Vidyo Workshop, the 2011 Midwest Law and Economics Association con-
ference, the 2011 Law and Society Association annual meeting, and the 2013 American Law and
Economics Association annual meeting. We would also like to thank Edward Dumoulin, Ryan Finn,
Josh Lipton, Rodan Luo, Jordan Mikes, Noah Priluck, Chad Ranney, Amanda Tuninetti, and Bran-
don Une for valuable research assistance, and the venture capitalist (VC) attorneys who shared their
expertise with us. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Professor Ola Bengtsson (1975-2014),
who shared our interest in entrepreneurial finance and whose friendship and collegiality we will
sorely miss.
' A firm located in a particular state is generally permitted to incorporate in any other state and
to thereby have its internal affairs governed by that other state's corporate law (Easterbrook and
Fischel 1991).
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As a result, incorporation decisions are bimodal: public and private firms typi-
cally choose between home-state and Delaware incorporation, with most public
firms and large private firms going to Delaware (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2002;
Daines 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2003; Dammann and Schiindeln 2011).
Why would a firm today incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state?
Traditional accounts focus on the inherent quality of Delaware's corporate law
rules. Under the race-to-the-top view, firms choose Delaware because its law
maximizes firm value for shareholders (Winter 1977; Romano 1985). Under the
race-to-the-bottom view, firms choose Delaware because it offers corporate law
that favors insiders at other parties' expense (Cary 1974; Bebchuk 1992; Bar-Gill,
Barzuza, and Bebchuk 2006).
More recent explanations for why a firm might choose Delaware turn not on
the inherent quality of its law but rather on the number of other firms incor-
porated in Delaware. Drawing on the network-effects literature, Klausner (1995)
argues that a firm (Firm X) committing to a long-term domicile (such as an
initial-public-offering [IPO] firm that cannot easily change domicile after go-
ing public) may choose Delaware even if its corporate law is not optimal because
a large number of other firms will be domiciled in Delaware in the future. This
large, continuing network of Delaware firms ensures that Firm X will have access
to more case law and better legal services in the future than if it domiciles in its
home state, where the firm network is smaller.
Relatedly, Kahan and Klausner (1997) argue that contractual terms (in loan
agreements, charters, and the like) may persist not because of their quality but
simply because of the learning benefits (such as drafting efficiencies and a reduc-
tion in uncertainty) that arise from these terms having already been widely used.
Their analysis suggests that a firm may choose Delaware simply because of the
learning benefits generated by so many other firms having chosen Delaware do-
micile in the past.
We put forward and test a new explanation for why a firm today would go to
Delaware rather than stay home: that Delaware law can serve as a lingua franca
for investors around the country, both in state and out of state. The lingua franca
explanation builds on the fact that, after decades of Delaware's dominance, busi-
ness parties throughout the United States- including investors and their law-
yers-are generally familiar only with Delaware law and the law of their home
state (Daines 2002; Klausner 1995; Kahan and Klausner 1997). As Daines (2002,
p. 1581) puts it, "Focusing on one national standard allows [corporate lawyers]
to economize on the need to keep up to date with developments in multiple ju-
risdictions. Delaware is thus much like a common language and such lawyers are
'bi-lingual,' speaking Delaware law plus the local dialect." Thus, a firm wishing to
attract investors from around the country may choose Delaware merely to pro-
vide a law that can be "spoken" by all of its investors.
Although the lingua franca effect is similar to the network and learning expla-
nations for Delaware's dominance, the lingua franca effect is conceptually dis-
tinct and yields different predictions. Network effects and learning benefits pre-
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dict that a particular firm choosing between two jurisdictions will incorporate in
the jurisdiction that will serve (network effects) or has served (learning benefits)
as the legal domicile for more firms. Network and learning explanations depend
on other firms' decisions, not on the identity of the firm's investors. The lingua
franca effect, on the other hand, predicts that this firm's choice between the two
jurisdictions will be directly affected by its own investors' relative familiarity with
these jurisdictions. In other words, unlike network effects or learning benefits,
the lingua franca effect is generated by the backgrounds of the particular inves-
tors at the bargaining table.
Of course, all of these explanations for Delaware's dominance in the chartering
market, including network effects and learning benefits, may help explain why
Delaware law (and not the corporate law of some other state) became a lingua
franca in the first place. Corporate lawyers may choose to learn Delaware as a
second (or first) language in part because of network effects or learning benefits
that give Delaware an advantage over other states' corporate laws, in part because
of the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, in part because so many firms
are or will be incorporated in Delaware (for whatever reason), and in part be-
cause it will be easier to work with other Delaware- speaking lawyers to incorpo-
rate new firms.2 We abstract here from the question of why Delaware law became
a lingua franca. Our claim is that, given that most lawyers around the country
are familiar with Delaware law, some firms will domicile in Delaware simply to
provide all of their investors with a language that each investor can understand.3
We test for a lingua franca effect using a sample of 1,850 start-up firms fi-
nanced by venture capitalists (VCs) that received their first round of VC financ-
ing between 2000 and 2002. Venture capitalists and their attorneys will wish to
be familiar with the corporate law applicable to the start-up: they rely on a com-
plex set of contracts whose drafting and implementation are dependent on subtle
features of the governing law (Fried and Ganor 2006). By offering a more famil-
iar corporate law (everything else equal), a start-up's entrepreneur can lower the
cost of capital (Bengtsson and Bernhardt 2012). Because lawyers typically do not
speak any other language besides Delaware and home-state law (Daines 2002),
out-of-state investors and their lawyers are likely to be less familiar with the start-
up's home-state corporate law than with Delaware law.4 The lingua franca expla-
2 Church and King (1993) develop a network-effects model in which the benefit of language ac-
quisition is increasing in the number of individuals who speak the language. To the extent that law-
yers learn to speak Delaware simply because many other lawyers have learned or will learn to speak
Delaware, the lingua franca effect we identify could itself be considered to reflect the operation of
network effects.
3 just as network effects and learning benefits associated with Delaware law may strengthen its
role as a lingua franca, a lingua franca effect may strengthen the network effects and learning ben-
efits associated with Delaware incorporation by increasing the number of firms domiciled in Dela-
ware. In other words, causality between the lingua franca effect and network and learning benefits
effects can run in both directions.
4 The VC's attorney will handle legal issues arising from a portfolio investment and therefore may
have a stronger preference over domicile than the VC itself. Thus, it might be argued that the loca-
tion of the VC's attorney is what matters, not the location of the VC. But VCs are typically advised
either by in-house counsel (Kobylarz 2006) or by law firms located in their home state. We asked 10
867
The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
nation thus predicts that a start-up is more likely to incorporate or reincorporate
in Delaware as the number of out-of-state VCs increases.
Start-ups financed by VCs provide a particularly desirable empirical setting
for testing the lingua franca theory. First, there is considerable variation in each
start-up's mix of investors. Some start-ups receive financing from out-of-state in-
vestors, while others are financed exclusively by in-state investors. In contrast,
public firms lack such cross-sectional variation because there is no control group
of public firms whose investors are all (or even predominantly) located in a single
state. Second, start-ups provide longitudinal variation in both their mix of in-
vestors and their state of incorporation. In particular, start-ups typically receive
financing over several rounds, and the identity of participating investors often
changes from one round to the next (Gompers 1995; Broughman and Fried 2012)
along with the firm's domicile.
We find, consistent with the lingua franca hypothesis, that having more out-
of-state investors significantly increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation
in the first round of financing. Everything else equal, moving from zero to two
out-of-state investors in the first round of financing increases the likelihood of
Delaware incorporation by 14 percentage points (from 68 to 82 percent). We also
find, consistent with the lingua franca hypothesis, that each additional out-of-
state investor increases the likelihood that a firm will reincorporate in Delaware
in a follow-on round of financing by approximately 4-6 percentage points.
The lingua franca hypothesis also predicts that in-state investors-which are
likely to be familiar with both Delaware and their home-state corporate law-
will have a relatively weak preference, if any, for home-state law. Consistent with
this prediction, the number of in-state investors participating in each round of fi-
nancing has little effect on choice of domicile. In-state investors appear to be rel-
atively indifferent between Delaware and the home-state law, while out-of-state
investors tend to prefer Delaware.
We also divide out-of-state investors into two groups: those that have some
familiarity with home-state corporate law because they have previously invested
in a home- state- domiciled firm and those that do not have such exposure to
home-state corporate law. Consistent with the lingua franca effect, we find that
a start-up is less likely to incorporate in Delaware if its out-of-state VC investors
have already invested in firms incorporated in the start-up's home state and thus
have greater familiarity with home-state corporate law. In other words, demand
for Delaware law is greatest when a firm receives financing from out-of-state VCs
that appear to have no prior exposure to the start-up's home-state corporate law.
Our results are statistically significant and robust to alternative econometric
prominent VC firms in our sample about the location of their legal counsel; each of the seven VC
firms that responded to our query reported that its counsel was located in the VC firm's home state.
Thus, to the extent that it is the VC's counsel's location that matters for lingua franca, we believe it is
reasonable to treat the location of the VC firm as a proxy for the location of the VC's counsel.
' Because VC-backed firms can easily (and frequently do) change domicile, the network effect
described in Klausner (1995), which arises when firms must make a long-term commitment to a
particular domicile, is less likely to be present in the start-up setting.
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specifications. We control for a variety of factors that may affect choice of domi-
cile such as start-up firm characteristics, the law firm representing the start-up
firm, VC reputation, and characteristics of home-state corporate law. In separate
specifications, we also include state dummy variables in place of the corporate
law variables.
Of course, omitted variables could correlate with both domicile and the num-
ber of out-of-state investors. For example, a more complex firm may both face a
higher likelihood of litigation, which could in theory increase the value of Dela-
ware corporate law, and require financing from out-of-state investors. If so, un-
observed characteristics of the start-up firm would independently increase both
its need for out-of-state financing and its likelihood of choosing Delaware.
To address endogeneity concerns, we employ two identification strategies.
First, taking advantage of the longitudinal variation in our data, we use first-
differences regression analysis to investigate whether the arrival of out-of-state
investors causes firms originally incorporated in their home states to reincor-
porate in Delaware in subsequent rounds of financing. This first-differences ap-
proach eliminates potential bias due to time-constant unobserved traits of each
start-up. Under this identification strategy, we obtain statistically significant re-
sults consistent with a lingua franca effect.
Second, we create a VC fixed-effects model that examines variation within each
VC's portfolio. We compare the use of Delaware domicile when a VC invests at
home with when the same VC invests out of state. This approach enables us to
eliminate potential bias due to unobserved variation across different VC firms.
We find, consistent with a lingua franca effect, that the same VC is likely to use
Delaware domicile more frequently when investing out of state than when invest-
ing in state.
To illustrate by way of a specific VC firm, California-based Kleiner Perkins is
approximately 18 percentage points more likely to use Delaware incorporation
when it invests in a start-up located outside California than when it invests in
one located in California (100 versus 81.6 percent), and when Kleiner Perkins
invests in a California-based start-up that is financed solely by California-based
VC firms, the likelihood of Delaware incorporation drops to 64.3 percent. While
Kleiner Perkins exhibits a relatively strong lingua franca effect, its domicile pref-
erences reflect those of VC firms in aggregate: they are more likely to insist on
Delaware law out of state than in state.
Not surprisingly, we find that factors other than lingua franca also affect do-
micile choice. Consistent with Kahan's (2006) study of public firms, we find that
states with a high-quality judiciary and more flexible corporate law are somewhat
more likely to retain in-state corporations. And consistent with Daines's (2002)
study of IPO firms, we find that start-ups represented by regional rather than na-
tional law firms are more likely to incorporate in their home states. Our results
suggest, however, that lingua franca is likely to be a more important determinant
than these other two factors.
It is important to emphasize that our results may significantly understate the
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extent to which the lingua franca effect (rather than other factors) drives the use
of Delaware domicile. Because Delaware has become such a dominant player in
the market for incorporations, in any given state there may well be investors (and
lawyers) who are more familiar with Delaware law than with that state's own law
(Carney, Shepherd, and Shepherd 2012). A firm financed entirely by such in- state
investors might thus choose Delaware simply for reasons of familiarity. Put dif-
ferently, Delaware law may also serve as a lingua franca for in-state investors,
some of whom may not be fluent in home-state law. Our methodology enables
us to detect only the lingua franca effect arising from the presence of out-of-state
investors.
This project contributes to the empirical literature on corporate charters in
three respects. First, we identify a new dimension to domicile decisions. Research-
ers have previously identified three types of factors bearing on domicile choice:
(1) inherent features of home-state corporate law, including antitakeover statutes
(Subramanian 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2003; Ferris, Lawless, and Noronha
2006), flexibility and judicial quality (Kahan 2006; Dammann and Schiindeln
2011), whether the home state has adopted the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act (Bebchuk and Cohen 2003), and franchise taxes (Romano 1985); (2)
whether the corporation's law firm is regional or national (Daines 2002); and (3)
characteristics of the corporation itself, including the size of the firm (Bebchuk
and Cohen 2003; Dammann and Schiindeln 2011). Our study suggests a fourth
dimension to domicile decisions: the characteristics of investors and in particular
the familiarity of investors with different corporate laws.
Second, our study provides additional evidence that Delaware's continued suc-
cess is not due solely to the inherent quality of its corporate law but rather is in
part due to investors' relative familiarity with it. Klausner (1995) argues that net-
work effects arising from the presence of so many firms incorporated in Delaware
may prevent a state from competing with Delaware even if that state offers better
law. The learning benefits associated with the repeated use of Delaware provisions
(Kahan and Klausner 1997) could have similar anticompetitive effects. Our study
suggests yet another reason why another state may have difficulty competing with
Delaware. For that state to be successful, enough lawyers would need to learn a
second or third "language." But the expected benefit of learning a second or third
language will be low given that Delaware fluency already allows a corporate attor-
ney in any state to communicate with most corporate attorneys in that state and
in other states. As a result, lawyers will be reluctant to learn a new language, and
any state seeking to challenge Delaware is likely to fail to acquire market share.
This lingua franca effect further raises the barrier to competition and may hinder
desirable state-level legal innovation (Carney, Shepherd, and Shepherd 2012).
Third, this project contributes to the literature on how VCs influence the gov-
ernance of start-up companies. Prior work has shown that VCs negotiate for a
complex bundle of cash-flow and control rights (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003)
that typically includes board seats (Lerner 1995; Broughman 2013), protective
provisions (Bengtsson 2011), and conversion rights (Schmidt 2003; Hellmann
870
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2006). The ability of VCs to realize their cash-flow rights depends in part on
where the firm is domiciled (Broughman and Fried 2010). Our study extends this
literature by showing that VC investors influence the choice of corporate law that
will govern the start-up.
For methodological reasons, our study focuses on private firms. But it is worth
mentioning its implications for the domicile choices of public firms. If private
firms choose Delaware law to provide a lingua franca for all of their investors, it
stands to reason that firms wishing to sell their shares to public investors around
the country through an IPO may also choose Delaware law in part to provide a
common language for their shareholders. Indeed, we find that 93 percent of the
firms in our sample that ultimately went public were incorporated in Delaware at
the time of their IPO, a level that is significantly higher than the 78 percent base-
line rate of Delaware incorporation for our sample as a whole.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
data set and provides summary statistics on 1,850 firms' states of incorporation
and reincorporation. Section 3 provides baseline empirical results, testing our
hypothesis with both cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Section 4 uses VC
fixed-effects regressions to address potential endogeneity concerns in the baseline
results. Section 5 considers alternative explanations for the correlation between
out-of-state investors and Delaware incorporation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
To test the lingua franca prediction-that the likelihood of incorporation or re-
incorporation in Delaware increases with the number of out-of-state investors-
we use data from a sample of VC-backed start-up firms. This section describes
our data and provides summary statistics on state of incorporation and reincor-
poration for the firms in our sample.
2.1. Data Sources
Data were obtained from the VentureXpert (VX) database provided by Thom-
son Financial. Our sample is limited to U.S.-based start-ups that received their
first round of VC investment between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002,
and received at least $5 million in total VC financing over all rounds of invest-
ment.6 These criteria yield a sample of 1,998 start-up firms.
VentureXpert does not include firm domicile in its database. We use pub-
lic records data from Lexis-Nexis and the Delaware Secretary of State to match
6 Limiting our analysis to firms that received at least $5 million in total financing enables us to
focus on higher-quality firms, where domicile is likely to matter more.
We collected the data in 2008. Because VentureXpert (VX) appears to have since added infor-
mation about other firms that were not in the database in 2008, the same criteria would yield a larger
sample if the data were collected today. However, we have no reason to believe that increasing the
sample size would significantly affect our results.
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each firm in our sample with incorporation records. Matching by use of the firm
name provided by VX, we identified the state of incorporation for 1,850 of the
1,998 firms in our original sample, a 93 percent match rate. These 1,850 firms re-
ceived a total of 6,217 rounds of financing.
2.2. Sample Description
Tables 1-4 provide descriptive statistics for the 1,850 firms in our sample.
Sample firms are primarily high-tech businesses, with almost half in a computer-
related sector (Table 4). Start-ups in our sample received, on average, $36.8 mil-
lion over 3.6 rounds of VC financing (Table 1). The median firm received funding
from five different investors, of which two were out-of-state investors. Table 4
shows exit outcomes as reported by VX. Of the 1,850 firms, approximately one-
third of the sample firms had an exit-either an IPO (n = 103) or a private sale
(n = 536). The remaining two-thirds were, as of 2008, either defunct (n = 295) or
active (n = 916).
2.3. States oflncorporation and Reincorporation
For each firm in our sample, we collected data on the initial state of incorpo-
ration and any subsequent reincorporation. Consistent with studies of public
firms (Daines 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2003) and private firms (Dammann and
Schiindeln 2011), we find that a start-up firm typically makes a binary choice, in-
corporating either in its home state or in Delaware. Table 2 shows that just over
two-thirds (67.8 percent) of sample firms choose Delaware as the initial state of
incorporation, and, of the remaining 32.2 percent, most (28.7 percent) incorpo-
rate in their home states. Only 3.5 percent of sample firms choose to incorporate
in a jurisdiction other than Delaware or their home state.
Larger firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware and therefore less likely
to incorporate in their home state. Table 3 divides sample firms into quintiles
based on the total amount of VC financing received over the life of the firm and
reports the final state of incorporation for each quintile. 9 In the largest quintile,
89.2 percent of the firms use Delaware; in the smallest quintile, only 69.6 percent
of the firms use Delaware.
The bimodal choice-between Delaware and home state-is especially pro-
nounced in the final state of incorporation. Figure 1 displays each firm's final
state of incorporation relative to its headquarters location. For ease of presen-
tation, Figure 1 includes results only from firms located in states with at least
15 observations (or in Delaware or Nevada). Delaware and Nevada are included
' The Lexis-Nexis public records database includes domicile data (via secretary-of state filings) for
locally domiciled firms of all states except Delaware. Information about Delaware domicile was ob-
tained from doing-business forms filed by Delaware-domiciled firms in their home states and from
the State of Delaware, Department of State: Division of Corporations (https://delecorp.delaware
.gov/tin/GlNameSearch.jsp).
The "final state" is the state of incorporation at the time of exit (initial public offering [IPO] or
acquisition) or, if there has been no exit event, the state of incorporation as of 2008.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms
Mean Median SD
Financing rounds 3.58 3 2.19
Investors 5.91 5 3.92
Out-of state investors 2.88 2 2.76
In-state investors 1.82 1 1.83
Amount invested ($millions) 36.85 23.2 48.58
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received first-
round venture capital financing between January 1, 2000, and December
31, 2002. The identities of a start-up's investors are not always disclosed
in VentureXpert. Consequently, the sum of out-of-state investors and in-
state investors does not necessarily equal a firm's total number of investors
(that is, the total may include investors whose identity and location are not
disclosed).
Table 2
State of Incorporation for Sample Firms
Original State Final State
ofIncorporation ofIncorporation
N % N % Change
Delaware 1,254 67.8 1,457 78.8 11.0
Home state 531 28.7 359 19.4 -9.3
Other state 65 3.5 34 1.8 -1.7
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received first-
round venture capital financing between January 1, 2000, and December 31,
2002. The most commonly selected other states chosen as the final state of
incorporation are Nevada (n = 5), California (n = 4), Massachusetts (n = 3),
Ohio (n = 3), and Pennsylvania (n = 3).
because they represent important chartering destinations. The graph is jittered to
avoid points appearing directly on top of each other. Approximately 98 percent
of firms choose to incorporate either in their home states (the diagonal cluster of
points) or in Delaware (the horizontal cluster of points).
When reincorporation occurs, it is almost always into Delaware. From the ini-
tial to the final state of incorporation, Delaware's share increases from 67.8 to
78.8 percent, while the home-state share declines from 28.7 to 19.4 percent and
other states' share declines from 3.5 to 1.8 percent (Table 2). Almost one-third
of firms originally incorporated in their home states reincorporate in Delaware.
Table 5 provides detailed data on reincorporations in our sample. A total of 217
firms reincorporated, out of which 205 (approximately 95 percent) switched to
Delaware. This change is typically made in connection with a new round of fi-
nancing, often the first or second round (Table 5).
2.4. Investor Location and Delaware Incorporation
Tables 6 and 7 report the likelihood of Delaware incorporation as a function
of the mix of in-state and out-of-state investors. The general pattern, for both
873
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Table 3
Final State of Incorporation (%), by Firm Size Quintile
Smallest Largest
1 2 3 4 5
Delaware 69.6 75.4 79.6 79.2 89.2
Home state 26.7 22.1 18.8 19.2 10.8
Other state 3.6 2.5 1.6 1.6 0
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received
first-round venture capital financing between January 1, 2000, and
December 31, 2002. Quintiles are based on the total amount of financing
raised by each firm over all rounds of investment.
Table 4
Likelihood of Delaware Incorporation by Exit Status and Industry Sector
Delaware as Delaware as
Original State Final State 0
N N % N % Change
Exit status:
Initial public offering 103 76 73.8 96 93.2 19.4
Acquisition 536 367 68.4 414 77.2 8.8
Active 916 599 65.4 719 78.5 13.1
Defunct 295 212 71.8 228 77.3 5.5
Sector:
Computer related 905 615 67.9 710 78.5 10.6
Non-high tech 99 58 58.5 70 70.7 12.2
Communications or media 366 255 69.6 286 78.1 8.5
Biotech 129 95 73.6 110 85.3 11.7
Medical or life sciences 158 110 69.6 135 85.4 15.8
Semiconductor or other electronic 193 121 62.7 146 75.6 12.9
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received first-round venture capital financing
between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002.
first-round and later-round financings, is that each additional out-of-state inves-
tor significantly increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, whereas the
number of in-state investors has little effect on domicile choice. For example, in
later rounds (Table 7), firms receiving financing from one out-of-state investor
incorporate in Delaware with 71-79 percent probability, whereas firms receiv-
ing financing from four or more out-of-state investors incorporate in Delaware
with 92-94 percent probability. A move from one out-of-state investor to four
or more out-of-state investors is associated with an increase of approximately 17
percent in the probability of Delaware incorporation, whereas a similar change in
the number of in-state investors (from one to more than four) is associated with
an increase of only 2 percent in the likelihood of Delaware incorporation. These
results are consistent with a lingua franca effect. Out-of-state investors exhibit a
clear preference for Delaware incorporation, whereas in-state investors appear to
be indifferent between home-state and Delaware incorporation.
Delaware Law
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of state of incorporation relative to headquarters location
2.5. Investors' State-Dependent Domicile Preferences
We examine the use of Delaware in each VC's portfolio of investments. Figure
2 compares the likelihoods of Delaware incorporation in two situations: when a
VC invests in its home state and when the same VC invests out of state. For all
VCs in our sample that participated in at least 30 rounds of financing, the figure
plots the likelihood that a portfolio firm will incorporate in Delaware as a func-
tion of whether the start-up is headquartered in the same state as the VC investor.
Results are displayed according to the fraction of out-of-state firms in the VC's
portfolio (the horizontal axis). Consequently, for each VC, Figure 2 plots two
points: the likelihood of Delaware incorporation when investing in state and the
likelihood when investing out of state. The gap between these points is a rough
measure of the lingua franca effect. Figure 2 also includes three Lowess curves
that reflect the likelihood of Delaware domicile for out-of-state portfolio firms
(solid line), in-state portfolio firms (dotted line), and in-state portfolio firms
where all VCs in the round are located in the start-up's home state (dashed line).
Figure 2 indicates that the lingua franca effect arises primarily from VCs that
invest less than 70 percent of their portfolio out of state (which we call regional
VCs). Venture capitalists that invest principally out of state (which we call na-
tional VCs) use Delaware with higher frequency. For national VCs, the choice
between Delaware and home-state law does not seem to depend on where the
start-up is located; they are likely to use Delaware domicile both when investing
at home and when investing out of state. Why? National VCs may invest out of
875
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Table 5
Destinations and Timing of Reincorporation for Sample Firms
N %
Reincorporation destination:
Delaware 205 94.5
Home state 7 3.2
Other state 5 2.3
Total 217 100
Timing of reincorporation in Delaware (n = 205):
First round (or earlier) 116 56.6
Second round 33 16.1
Third round 22 10.7
Fourth round 9 4.4
Fifth round (or later) 11 5.4
After last round of financing 14 6.8
Total 205 100
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received first-
round venture capital financing between January 1, 2000, and December
31, 2002. Of the seven firms moving to home-state domicile, four were in
California, and there was one each in Texas, Kentucky, and Maryland. Of
firms switching to an "other state" domicile, two went to Nevada, and one
each went to Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia. Reincorporation after the
first round of financing typically occurs within a 6-month window (3 months
on either side) of a new round of financing. Reincorporations not occurring
within 3 months of any round are assumed to be in connection with the
subsequent round of financing.
state with such frequency that they are less familiar with the corporate law in
their home states, they may migrate to Delaware simply to standardize contract
terms across all the firms in their portfolios, or they may believe that Delaware
law is better. Overall, however, Figure 2 supports the lingua franca hypothesis
and shows that, in the aggregate, VCs behave differently when investing in state
than when they go out of state.
For illustrative purposes, we report results from four well-known Califor-
nia VC firms in Table 8. For example, Kleiner Perkins is almost 36 percentage
points more likely to use Delaware incorporation if it invests in a start-up located
outside California than if it invests in a start-up located in California that relies
100 percent on California-based VCs (100 versus 64.3 percent). While Kleiner
Perkins exhibits a fairly strong lingua franca tendency-using Delaware domi-
cile for all of its out-of-state investments-it is not particularly unusual. Indeed,
the four VCs listed are on average 32 percentage points more likely to use Del-
aware when investing outside California than when investing in California with
other California-based VCs (94.9 versus 62.5 percent). Consistent with the lin-
gua franca effect, the use of Delaware law for in-state investments increases when
"foreign" (non- California) VCs participate in the financing.
The domicile choices of these California VCs, and of VCs in aggregate, strongly
suggest that the choice of Delaware domicile cannot be fully accounted for by
unobserved dimensions of a start-up that have nothing to do with the identity of
its investors. For unobserved start-up dimensions to account for the difference in
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Table 6
Percentages of Delaware Incorporation in the
First Round of Financing
Out-of State Investors
In-State Investors 0 1 2 3+
0 73.4 78.7 93.1
1 63.6 73.3 82.0 84.2
2 68.9 81.2 72.2 87.5
3+ 70.8 79.5 72.8 100
Note. Values indicate the likelihood of Delaware incorporation
at the first round of venture capital financing in relation to the
number of in-state and out-of-state investors participating in the
round.
Table 7
Percentages of Delaware Incorporation in Follow-on
Rounds of Financing
Out-of State Investors
In-State Investors 0 1 2 3 4+
0 77.6 81.9 79.8 92.2
1 67.2 72.1 73.8 82.6 92.0
2 65.8 71.1 86.2 83.8 92.3
3 69.8 79.2 80.8 81.5 93.1
4+ 66.0 77.8 77.6 81.5 94.4
Note. Values indicate the likelihood of Delaware incorporation in a follow-on
round of venture capital financing based on the number of in-state and out-
of-state investors participating in the round.
domiciling decisions, one would need to believe that, for firms in VCs' portfolios,
home-state firms are, in aggregate, substantially different along these unobserved
dimensions than firms outside their home state. To us, this seems unlikely.
3. Baseline Empirical Results
To test the lingua franca hypothesis, we first examine the choice of legal domi-
cile made at the first round of VC financing and then consider reincorporation
into Delaware in connection with a subsequent financing round.
3.1. State of Incorporation at the First Round of Venture Capitalist Financing
We estimate, using logit regression, the following equation for choice of Dela-
ware incorporation in connection with the first round of VC financing:
Delaware = a + P x Out-of-State Investors + P2 x Local Exposure
+ P xX + (
where c is the error term and X is a vector of included control variables. The de-
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Table 8
Likelihood of Delaware Incorporation (%) for Portfolio Firms Financed by
Select California Venture Capitalists (VCs)
California
Headquarters
and Only California Non-California
VC Firm California VCs Headquarters Headquarters
Accel Partners 76.3 76.0 100.0
Draper Fisher Jurvetson 60.6 60.3 79.7
Kleiner Perkins 64.3 81.6 100.0
U.S. Venture Partners 48.9 61.1 100.0
Average 62.5 69.8 94.9
Note. The sample consists of 1,850 U.S.-based start-ups that received first-round VC financing
between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002.
pendent variable, Delaware, equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware at
the time of the first round of financing and zero otherwise. 0 For the purposes of
equation (1), all variables are defined as of the first round of VC financing (t= 1).
There are two explanatory variables of interest: Out-of-State Investors, which
equals the number of out-of-state investors participating in the round, and Lo-
cal Exposure, which equals the number of out-of-state investors in the financing
round that have previously financed at least one of our sample firms that was
incorporated in the start-up's home state. The term Local Exposure can be un-
derstood as a rough proxy for out-of-state investors' familiarity with the local
dialect: home-state corporate law. Unfortunately, Local Exposure includes only
experience within our sample period; it does not reflect any familiarity based on
a VC's investment activity prior to 2000. Consequently, Local Exposure may be
an unreliable proxy for out-of-state investors' familiarity with home-state law in
financing rounds occurring early in our sample period.
The terms Out-of-State Investors and Local Exposure provide two proxies for
investors' familiarity. The combination of the two variables lets us separately
measure the marginal effect of an out-of-state investor with no prior exposure
to the start-up's home-state law (P3) as well as of an out-of-state investor with at
least some prior exposure to the start-up's home-state law (p, + The lingua
franca hypothesis predicts that P > 0 and P2 < 0. In other words, each additional
out-of-state investor will increase the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, but
the marginal effect will be smaller for out-of-state investors who have past experi-
ence with the start-up's home-state law.
We also control for various firm-level and state-level variables that may affect a
Our dependent variable compares Delaware domicile against both in-state and other-state do-
micile, lumping these last two groups into one category. Firms that incorporate in a state other than
Delaware or their home state are somewhat smaller than firms incorporated in their home state
(fewer investors, less financing, fewer rounds of financing). The inclusion of the other-state firms in
the same category as in-state firms does not, however, substantially impact our results: we reestimate
the models reported in Table 10 excluding other-state firms and find qualitatively similar results.
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start-up's state of incorporation. Table 9 defines the variables and provides sum-
mary statistics for each.
Table 10 presents regression results, reporting logit marginal effects with all
variables at their mean values. We first estimate Delaware as a function of our
two treatment variables: Out-of-State Investors and Local Exposure (model 1).
Models 2 and 3 add additional explanatory variables that control for various
firm-level characteristics of each business." We use Size Proxy ($millions) as a
proxy for the size and complexity of the firm. 2 To measure VC Reputation, we
use the average age of the VC firms participating in the round, as in Gompers
(1996) and Hsu (2004).
In model 4, we add control variables for features of home-state corporate law
that may affect choice of domicile. First, we add three variables used in Kahan
(2006): Judicial Quality, Flexibility, and ATS Index. Judicial Quality addresses
the possibility that firms incorporate in Delaware because it is seen as having a
higher-quality judiciary than their home states (Romano 1993), Flexibility in-
dicates the level of flexibility given to parties by home-state law to design their
internal governance arrangements (Kahan 2006), and ATS Index captures the
strength of antitakeover protections offered by the home state (Kahan 2006); ATS
Index should be relevant only if the firm expects to go public.
Second, we record the franchise tax for the start-up's home state. The variable
Franchise Tax reflects the change in home-state fees when a firm incorporates at
home rather than in Delaware. If a firm domiciles at home rather than in Dela-
ware, it must pay its home state (a) an initial incorporation fee and (b) an annual
franchise tax and/or report fee. But the firm will avoid paying its home state (c) a
foreign qualification fee and (d) (sometimes) an annual foreign report fee. Thus,
we define Franchise Tax as (a) + (b) - (c) - (d).13 Tax rates are defined as of Janu-
ary 1, 2000, and we assume 100,000 shares outstanding (par value = $.00 1/share).
Most states charge the same flat fees to both home-state and Delaware- domiciled
firms (Kahan and Kamar 2001, 2002). For these states, Franchise Tax = 0.
Third, to control for the possibility that differences in contracting practices be-
tween East and West Coast firms affect incorporation- related decisions (Bengts-
son and Ravid 2009), we record whether the firm is headquartered in a state
located west of the Mississippi River. Fourth, to address other potential incorpo-
ration network benefits, we control for the number of publicly held firms incor-
porated in the start-up's home state (State Inc. Count) and for whether home-
" Because the identities of a start-up's investors are not always disclosed in VX, we are able to
include Out-of State Investors, In-State Investors, and Number of Investors in a single regression
model without introducing perfect multicollinearity among the right-hand-side variables.
12 While the aggregate amount invested in the firms across all rounds of financing is obviously not
known with precision before the final financing round, we assume that it correlates with parties' ex
ante expectations (as of the first financing round) regarding the firm's eventual size and complexity.
13 By incorporating in its home state rather than in Delaware, the firm will also avoid paying (e)
franchise taxes charged by Delaware. Since Delaware's franchise tax does not depend on a firm's
physical location, item e is essentially a constant term that would apply equally to all firms in our
sample. Thus, e does not need to be included in the definition of Franchise Tax.
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state corporate law is based on the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA
State).1
Finally, in model 5 we include a set of dummy variables for each state.5 Be-
cause of limited within-state variation in the dependent variable, models 4 and
5 are restricted to start-ups headquartered in states with at least 10 observations
and are thus estimated using a smaller sample of firms.
In each model reported in Table 10, we find results consistent with the lingua
franca hypothesis. As predicted, Out-of-State Investors has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on Delaware incorporation, while Local Exposure has a negative effect.
Adding an out-of-state investor increases the likelihood of Delaware incorpora-
tion by approximately 6-8 percentage points (PI). By contrast, in-state investors
have a negligible impact on choice of domicile. As is consistent with familiarity
driving domicile choices, an out-of-state investor's demand for Delaware incor-
poration is moderated by Local Exposure (that is, P, is negative in all models). 6 If
an out-of-state investor has at least some prior exposure to the start-up's home-
state law (as observed for our sample period), the firm is somewhat less likely to
incorporate in Delaware and more likely to incorporate in its home state. These
results are broadly consistent with the lingua franca explanation.
The magnitude of the lingua franca effect is material: moving from zero to two
out-of-state investors in the first round of financing increases the likelihood of
Delaware incorporation from 68 to 82 percent, nearly halving the likelihood (32
versus 18 percent) that a start-up will incorporate in any state other than Dela-
ware. These forecasts are based on estimates from model 3 with all other controls
held at their mean values.
Finally, we consider the effect of two legal factors identified in prior research as
affecting domicile choice: home-state legal flexibility and judicial quality. Consis-
tent with Kahan (2006), we find that firms are more likely to incorporate in their
home states and less likely to choose Delaware if the home-state law provides
greater flexibility and if the home state is perceived to have a higher-quality judi-
ciary.
To compare the relative magnitude of these two explanations with the lingua
franca hypothesis, we examine the likelihood of Delaware incorporation when
each variable is 1 standard deviation below its mean, as compared with 1 stan-
14 The first of these network variables, State Inc. Count, is also used by Daines (2002), while the
second, MBCA State, is used by Kahan (2006).
" Because of perfect multicollinearity, we cannot include the corporate-law variables and state
dummies in the same regression model.
16 It should be noted that the marginal effect for Local Exposure is statistically significant only
in model 3. As discussed above, there are measurement limitations for Local Exposure in the first
round of financing; these limitations are likely to reduce statistical significance. To address this con-
cern, we reestimated model 2 with all financing rounds occurring prior to 2001 removed, which
reduces the number of observations to 573. In an unreported regression on this reduced sample, we
found a marginal effect of -. 057 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level) for Local Exposure;
the coefficient estimate for Out-of State Investors remains positive and significant. It is also worth
noting that even using the full sample (where there are greater measurement limitations for Local
Exposure than in the reduced sample) our baseline results are still as predicted by the lingua franca
hypothesis: P, > 0 and P2 < 0.
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Table 10
State of Incorporation at the First Round of Venture Capital (VC) Financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment variable:
Out-of State Investors
Local Exposure
Firm-level controls:
Total Investors
In-State Investors
Investment ($millions)
Size Proxy ($millions)
VC Reputation
Sector dummies
Year dummies
State-level controls:
Judicial Quality
Flexibility
ATS Index
Franchise Tax
MBCA State
West of Mississippi
State Inc. Count
State dummies
N
Pseudo R2
.0793** .0600**
(.010) (.016)
-. 0305 -. 0373
(.028) (.030)
.0235'
(.011)
-. 0058
(.013)
-. 0001
(.001)
.0013**
(.000)
-. 0011
(.001)
No Yes
No No
1,847
.034
1,847
.049 .073 .097 .148
Note. The sample consists of a cross section of 1,850 U.S.-based VC-backed start-ups. Values are marginal
effects based on logit estimates evaluated at the mean of each variable. All variables are defined as of the
first round of VC financing. The dependent variable, Delaware, equals one if the firm was incorporated
in Delaware and zero otherwise. Standard errors (clustered at the state level and calculated via the delta
method) are in parentheses.
+ Significant at the 10 percent level; two-sided test.
** Significant at the 1 percent level; two-sided test.
dard deviation above its mean. On the basis of estimates from model 4, a move
from 1 standard deviation below its mean to 1 standard deviation above its mean
results in Out-of-State Investors being associated with a 16-percentage-point in-
crease (from 69 to 85 percent) in the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, while
Judicial Quality is associated with an 8-percentage-point decline (from 81 to 73
percent), and Flexibility is associated with an 11 -percentage-point decline (from
.0652**
(.017)
-. 0569+
(.025)
.0205+
(.011)
-. 0070
(.013)
-. 0013
(.001)
.0016**
(.000)
-. 0019+
(.001)
Yes
Yes
.0612**
(.015)
-. 0411
(.029)
.0174
(.011)
-. 0041
(.015)
-. 0010
(.001)
.0017**
(.000)
-. 0019+
(.001)
Yes
Yes
.0581**
(.019)
-. 0199
(.025)
.0153
(.015)
-. 0018
(.018)
-. 0014
(.002)
.0016**
(.000)
-. 0015
(.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,774
-. 1274
(.173)
-. 0781
(.075)
-. 0036
(.029)
.0000
(.000)
.0267
(.089)
-. 1953**
(.062)
-. 0006
(.001)
1,7741,847
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82 to 71 percent). While each of these effects is economically meaningful, the lin-
gua franca effect appears to have a larger effect on incorporation choice than does
flexibility or judicial quality.
3.2. Reincorporation in Delaware in Subsequent Financing Rounds
The results reported above are limited to incorporation decisions around first
rounds of financing. We now turn to examine whether the arrival of out-of-state
investors in subsequent rounds causes firms that initially incorporated in their
home states to reincorporate in Delaware.
Of firms originally incorporated in their home states, almost one-third ulti-
mately switched to Delaware; such reincorporation typically occurs in connec-
tion with a new round of financing. To take advantage of this longitudinal varia-
tion, we treat each financing round as a separate observation, creating panel data
indexed by start-up firm (i) and round of financing (t). We limit our attention
to situations in which the firm was not already incorporated in Delaware.' Our
panel thus consists of a subsample of 594 firms and 1,546 financing rounds.
One advantage of panel data is that we can isolate within-firm variation, thus
eliminating bias due to time-constant unobserved effects. To take advantage of
this feature, we construct a first- difference transformation of equation (1):
ADelaware = P x (AOut-of-State Investors) + P2 x (ALocal Exposure) (2)
+ Px AX + (,
where A indicates the change from round t - 1 to round t, ADelaware equals
one if the firm reincorporates to Delaware in round t and zero otherwise, AOut-
of-State Investors equals the number of Out-of-State Investors participating in
round t minus the number of Out-of-State Investors participating in round t - 1,
and ALocal Exposure equals Local Exposure in round t minus Local Exposure
in round t - 1. If some Out-of-State Investors who participated in a prior round
do not participate in the new round, it is possible for AOut-of-State Investors to
take negative values.8 The first- differences approach eliminates all time-constant
variables, both observed and unobserved effects (Wooldridge 2002).19 This forces
" If a firm reincorporates into Delaware in round t, any future rounds of financing are excluded.
Our analysis can be understood as a discrete time hazard model: we estimate the hazard of switch-
ing to Delaware in round t, conditional on surviving outside Delaware through the previous t - 1
rounds (Shumway 2001; Jenkins 1995).
" We include observations from the first round if the business was incorporated in its home state
prior to the first VC round. In first-round observations, the t - 1 value of each variable is 0. To ad-
dress the possibility that first-round reincorporations are different from reincorporations in subse-
quent rounds, we include separate dummy variables for each round of financing. We find qualita-
tively similar results when limiting our analysis to follow-on rounds of financing.
19 Removal of unobserved effects can also be accomplished through a firm fixed-effects model. We
chose to use the first- differences model rather than a firm fixed-effects model to focus on the change
from one round to the next rather than on the difference between each observation and the average
for the firm. We found similar results (unreported) using a firm fixed-effects model.
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Figure 3. The likelihood that a non-Delaware firm will reincorporate in Delaware in
connection with a new round of financing.
us to remove time-constant variables, such as sector and most of the state-level
control variables.
Before proceeding to multivariate regression results, we note the positive cor-
relation between an increase in the number of out-of-state investors and reincor-
poration in Delaware for firms not incorporated in Delaware prior to the round.
The horizontal axis in Figure 3 shows AOut-of-State Investors, while the verti-
cal axis measures the likelihood of reincorporation in Delaware. For example, if
a firm adds three out-of-state investors in a new round of financing, there is a
probability of approximately 23 percent that it will reincorporate in Delaware in
connection with the new financing. By contrast, if there is no change in the num-
her of out-of-state investors in a new round, the likelihood of reincorporation is
only 6 percent.
Reincorporation regression estimates are reported in Table 11. The results are
consistent with the lingua franca hypothesis. The arrival of out-of-state inves-
tors increases the likelihood of reincorporation in Delaware. We also find that
increased familiarity (ALocal Exposure) with home-state law decreases the like-
lihood of reincorporation in Delaware. These results are significant at the 1 per-
cent level in each model reported in Table 11. Reincorporation in Delaware is
most likely to occur when adding out-of-state investors with no prior exposure
to home-state law, of intermediate likelihood when adding out-of-state investors
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Table 11
Reincorporation in Delaware: Ordinary Least
Squares Regression Models
(6) (7) (8)
Treatment variable:
Out-of State Investors .0627** .0440** .0442**
(.009) (.012) (.012)
Local Exposure -. 0315** -. 0233** -. 0246**
(.010) (.008) (.009)
Firm-level controls:
Total Investors .0096 .0104
(.007) (.007)
In-State Investors -. 0153 -. 0175
(.011) (.011)
Investment ($millions) -. 0005 -. 0004
(.001) (.001)
VC Reputation .00004** .00009**
(.0000) (.0000)
Round dummies No No Yes
Year dummies No No Yes
R2 .051 .067 .081
Note. Values are first-difference regression estimates on a sample of 1,850
U.S.-based start-ups that received first-round venture capital financing
between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2002. Data are estimated for
each financing round in which the firm was at risk of reincorporating in
Delaware, a total of 594 firms and 1,546 rounds. The dependent variable,
ADelaware, equals one if the business reincorporated in Delaware in the
round of financing and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the firm
level, are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 1 percent level; two-sided test.
with some prior exposure to home-state law, and least likely to occur when add-
ing in-state investors.
Importantly, the first- differences regression format eliminates the influence of
time-constant unobserved effects on domicile and thereby removes many plau-
sible sources of bias in our estimates of Out-of-State Investors and Local Expo-
sure. For example, one might be concerned that Local Exposure reflects in part
the quality of home-state law, not just out-of-state VCs' familiarity with it. But
as long as the quality of home-state law is stable over our sample period, it will
not bias the coefficient for Local Exposure. The first- differences regression results
thus provide further support for the lingua franca hypothesis.
4. Venture Capitalist Fixed-Effects Regressions
Because out-of-state investors are not randomly assigned to our sample firms,
there is a risk that omitted variables may correlate with both the state of incor-
poration and the source of VC financing. For example, VCs that invest mostly
out of state (national VCs) may use Delaware law with higher frequency than
VCs that invest mostly in state (regional VCs), whether they are investing in state
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or out of state. If national VCs tend to rely on Delaware law and tend to choose
Delaware law for reasons other than lingua franca (for example, because of the
inherent quality of Delaware law), we may observe a correlation between out-of-
state investors and the use of Delaware law that is not driven by the lingua franca
effect but rather by the unobserved characteristics of the VCs that finance each
start-up.
To address this concern, we employ a VC fixed-effects analysis in which each
VC investment in a firm in their portfolio is treated as a separate observation.
To ensure meaningful within-group variation, we limit our analysis to VC firms
that participated in at least 30 rounds of financing involving start-up firms in our
sample. This gives us a subsample of 173 VC firms and 13,845 portfolio invest-
ments-including 3,397 first-round investments and 5,351 at-risk follow-on-
round investments. Using this sample of portfolio investments, we use fixed-
effects regression to estimate the following function:
Delaware = a + P x Out-of-State VC + P2 x Exposed VC
(3)
+ p X X + VC + S,
where Out-of-State VC equals one if the VC investor is headquartered in a dif-
ferent state than the start-up firm and zero if both the VC and the start-up are
headquartered in the same state, Exposed VC equals one if the VC investor had
previously invested in another start-up firm incorporated in the start-up's home
state and zero otherwise, and VC are a series of fixed effects for each VC firm.
The inclusion of the VC fixed effect lets us observe how each VC's behavior
changes when investing in state as opposed to out of state. The vector X includes
other factors that could affect the choice of domicile: the total amount invested
in the round, the number of other out-of-state VCs participating in the financing
round, the total number of other VCs participating in the financing round, and
dummy variables for sector, year, and round.
We separately estimate equation (3) for the first round of financing (models 9
and 10) and for follow-on rounds in which the firm was at risk of reincorporating
in Delaware (models 11 and 12). In models 10 and 12, we also include all of the
state-level variables used in model 4 to control for differences in state corporate
law that may impact the VC's choice of domicile. To avoid double counting sub-
sequent investments made by the same VCs, models 11 and 12 include only the
first investment made by each VC into the firm, which gives us a sample of 4,432
for model 11 and a sample of 4,282 for model 12. Results are reported in Table 12.
For both incorporation in the first round of financing and reincorporation in
subsequent rounds, we find that VC investors are approximately 5 percentage
points more likely to contract for Delaware incorporation when investing out of
state. This result is statistically significant in both models. Furthermore, the in-
clusion of fixed effects for each VC means that this result is not driven by unob-
served differences between the VC firms that finance each start-up. Our results
are less conclusive for our second treatment variable, Exposed VC. We find a null
887
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Table 12
Venture Capitalist (VC) Fixed-Effects Regression Models
First Round
(9) (10)
At Risk of Delaware
Incorporation in
Subsequent Round
(11) (12)
Treatment variables:
Out-of State VC
Exposed VC
Control variables:
Investment ($millions)
Size Proxy ($millions)
Other Out-of State VC
Other VC Total
Judicial Quality
Flexibility
ATS Index
Franchise Tax
MBCA State
West of Mississippi
State Inc. Count
Round dummies
N
VC clusters
R2 (within)
.0551'
(.025)
.0026
(.037)
.0000+
(.000)
.0006**
(.000)
.0225**
(.006)
.0194**
(.004)
No
3,397
172
.071
.0511+
(.026)
.0114
(.038)
.0000+
(.000)
.0007**
(.000)
.0156+
(.006)
.0196**
(.004)
-. 1054+
(.055)
-. 0636**
(.025)
.0104
(.012)
-. 0001+
(.000)
.0263
(.025)
-. 1466**
(.039)
.0006
(.000)
No
3,272
172
.099
.0417+
(.024)
-. 0245
(.032)
.0000**
(.000)
.0006**
(.000)
.0290**
(.005)
.0111**
(.004)
Yes
4,432
173
.257
.0433+
(.025)
-. 0227
(.033)
.0000**
(.000)
.0006**
(.000)
.0228**
(.006)
.0119**
(.004)
-. 1023+
(.051)
-. 0494+
(.023)
.0067
(.011)
-. 0001+
(.000)
.0476+
(.023)
-. 1425**
(.034)
-. 0003
(.000)
Yes
4,282
173
.273
Note. The sample is limited to venture capitalist firms that participated in at least 30 rounds of financing
involving the start-up firms in the full sample. The unit of analysis is each investment. The dependent variable
(Delaware) records whether the portfolio firm was incorporated in Delaware at the time of the investment.
The primary explanatory variable is Out-of-State VC, which equals one if the start-up was headquartered in
a different state than the VC firm and zero otherwise. Models 11 and 12 are limited to the first investment by
each VC in the company. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include sector and year
dummy variables and VC fixed effects.
+ Significant at the 10 percent level; two-sided test.
** Significant at the 1 percent level; two-sided test.
result for the first round of financing. As noted above, this is likely due to the fact
that our measure of Exposed VC is less accurate in first-round financings. For
follow-on financings, the coefficient on Exposed VC is negative, as predicted by
the lingua franca explanation, but not quite significant at normal levels. Overall,
the VC fixed-effects results support the lingua franca explanation for the use of
Delaware domicile and provide further confirmation that our findings are not
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driven by unobserved differences between the VC firms that finance different
start-ups.20
5. Alternative Causal Pathways
Even if the presence of out-of-state investors increases the likelihood of Del-
aware incorporation, this effect might have an explanation other than lingua
franca. In this section, we consider four alternative explanations for this relation-
ship and discuss why they are unlikely to explain away the lingua franca results.
5.1. Neutral Venue
One might believe that the correlation between out-of-state investors and Del-
aware incorporation is due to the preference for a neutral litigation venue: an
out-of-state investor may prefer that a start-up incorporate in Delaware rather
than stay at home so that the out-of-state investor can have an unbiased adju-
dicator rather than a home-state judge in the event of a dispute. While this ex-
planation is plausible on the surface, it is important to remember that Delaware
domicile is neither necessary nor sufficient for an out-of-state investor to obtain a
neutral venue. Delaware incorporation is not necessary because the parties could
contract directly over venue through a choice-of-forum clause in the charter or
elsewhere that requires the parties to resolve disputes in a specified venue. For ex-
ample, the corporation's charter could require that all disputes be resolved by ar-
bitrators or in the courts of a particular state. If parties wish to have their disputes
heard outside of home-state courts, they can easily do so without domiciling in
Delaware.
Delaware domicile is not sufficient to ensure that a Delaware court will han-
dle a dispute because suits arising in Delaware- domiciled firms can be (and often
are) brought elsewhere, typically in federal or state courts where the firms are
headquartered (Armour, Black, and Cheffins 2012). And although litigation be-
tween participants in start-ups is relatively uncommon, it is also easy to find cases
involving Delaware- domiciled firms that are adjudicated outside of Delaware.2 '
As the Delaware chancery court has reminded lawyers, the only way to ensure
that disputes arising in Delaware- domiciled firms are heard in Delaware is to put
a forum selection provision in the charter (In re Revlon Inc. S'holders Litig., 990
A.2d 940, 960 [2010]).2 As far as we know, such provisions have not been widely
used by start-ups. Thus, the desire for a neutral venue (that is, to avoid the bias of
20 In addition to the VC fixed-effects analysis reported here, we also estimated a two-stage least
squares model using the supply of in-state funds as an instrument for the number of out-of state
investors and found results consistent with the lingua franca explanation. These results are available
on request.
21 See Flying Disc Investments LP v. Baker Communications Fund II (Super. Ct. Calif., SF County,
2009, No. CGC 05447294), in which California founders of a Delaware- domiciled California-based
firm litigated in California against against New York VC investors, and John P. Kennedy v. Venrock
Associates (348 F.3d 584 [7th Cir. 2003]), in which common shareholders of a Delaware-domiciled
firm litigated in Illinois against out-of state VC investors.
22 For a discussion of forum selection clauses, see Armour et al. (2012, pp. 1392-94).
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home-state judges) does not appear capable of explaining our results that a firm
is more likely to domicile in Delaware if it has more out-of-state investors.
5.2. Home-State Familiarity
Almost all firms domicile either in Delaware or in their home state. Thus, the
positive correlation between the fraction of out-of-state investors and Delaware
domicile implies a positive correlation between the fraction of in-state investors
and home-state domicile. One might think that these results are driven not by
Delaware law's use as a lingua franca but rather by in-state investors' relative fa-
miliarity with, and thus excessive use of, home-state law. In particular, the ob-
served patterns might appear consistent with a world in which Delaware law is
of higher intrinsic quality than in-state law and each in-state investor must incur
learning costs to use Delaware law but not home-state law. In such a world, firms
financed mostly or entirely by in-state investors would often choose home-state
law to save learning costs even when the investors know that their law is other-
wise inferior to Delaware's.
If home-state familiarity were driving our results, we would expect an increase
in the number of in-state investors (everything else equal) to increase the likeli-
hood of home-state domicile. However, we find (Tables 5 and 6) that the number
of in-state investors has little impact on the choice between home-state and Dela-
ware incorporation. This finding suggests that while out-of-state investors have a
strong preference for Delaware (when they invest out of state), in-state investors
are relatively indifferent between home-state and Delaware domicile. Our results
thus appear more consistent with the lingua franca explanation than with home-
state familiarity.23
5.3. California Effect
More than 40 percent of our sample firms are headquartered in California.
Venture capitalist norms (Suchman and Cahill 1996) and contracting prac-
tices (Bengtsson and Ravid 2009) may be different in California than elsewhere.
More important, California has an unusual long-arm statute (Cal. Corp. Code,
sec. 2115) that purports to extend numerous substantive requirements of Cali-
fornia corporate law to quasi- California firms-firms domiciled out of state that
have most of their assets and shareholders located in California (Fried and Ganor
2006). Section 2115 thus subjects a California-based firm domiciled in Delaware
23 Further evidence that home-state familiarity is not driving our results comes from the fact that
firms rarely incorporate in a state other than Delaware or the firm's home state. If home-state fa-
miliarity were driving our results, we would expect to see more firms incorporating in a third ju-
risdiction, namely, the out-of state investor's home state. For example, if a group of California VCs
finance a start-up located outside California, home-state familiarity would predict that, everything
else equal, these VCs would favor California incorporation for the out-of state firm, not Delaware.
We do not observe this behavior (see Figure 1). Instead, Delaware functions as a national standard
regardless of investor location, a pattern that is more consistent with the lingua franca explanation
than with home-state familiarity.
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Table 13
Robustness Checks
First Round Reincorporation
Non Non-
California Law Firm California National Regional
Firms Data Firms Law Firm Law Firm
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Treatment variable:
Out-of State Investors .0370' .0635** .0428+ .0333 .0380+
(.022) (.023) (.019) (.031) (.019)
Local Exposure -. 1164+ -. 0134 -. 0334+ -. 0040 -. 0356+
(.065) (.034) (.016) (.008) (.016)
Firm-level controls:
Total Investors .0309+ .0117 .0112 .0120 .0162
(.018) (.017) (.013) (.015) (.011)
In-State Investors -. 0031 -. 0138 .0245 .0044 -. 0281+
(.027) (.019) (.024) (.021) (.016)
Investment ($millions) .0018 .0015 -. 0006 -. 0007 -. 0006
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.001)
VC Reputation -. 0012 -. 0015+ .0001** .0000 .0001+
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
National Law Firm .0498+
(.021)
Sector dummies Yes Yes No No No
Round dummies N.A. N.A. Yes Yes Yes
N 1,091 1,022 765 284 635
Firm clusters N.A. N.A. 324 114 223
Wald X2 173.57 467.46 N.A. N.A. N.A.
R2 N.A. N.A. .122 .074 .078
Note. Models 13 and 14 report logit marginal effects for the decision to incorporate in Delaware, with
Delaware as the dependent variable. Using first-difference (ordinary least squares) regression, models 15-
17 estimate the decision for each subsequent financing round, with ADelaware as the dependent variable.
Models 13 and 15 are limited to sample firms headquartered outside California, and models 14, 16, and
17 are limited to sample firms for which VentureXpert identifies the law firm representing the business.
The explanatory variables for the reincorporation models are in first-difference format (that is, A). Robust
standard errors (calculated using the delta method in models 13 and 14 and clustered at the firm level in
models 15-17) are in parentheses. All regressions include year dummy variables.
+Significant at the 10 percent level; two-sided test.
** Significant at the 1 percent level; two-sided test.
to two sets of corporate laws (California and Delaware) when there are relatively
few out-of-state investors, which makes a Delaware domicile less attractive for
such a firm. If Delaware domicile is generally beneficial, we would expect section
2115 to produce a correlation between out-of-state investors and Delaware domi-
cile in California, even absent a lingua franca effect. One may thus be concerned
that our results are driven by a California effect that has nothing to do with lingua
franca.
To address this concern, we exclude firms located in California and then rees-
timate equations (1) and (2) on a subsample of 1,091 firms headquartered out-
side California. Regression results for the first round of financing are reported
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in Table 13, model 13, and results for reincorporation are reported in model 15.
In neither model does the exclusion of California firms qualitatively change our
findings.
5.4. Start-up's Law Firm: Regional or National
The identity of the law firm representing the start-up is reported in VX only
for about half of the firms in our sample. Consequently, the regressions reported
in Sections 3 and 4 do not control for the identity of the start-up's law firm, even
though that law firm's familiarity with Delaware law (relative to home-state law)
may itself affect the choice of domicile. For example, Daines (2002) finds that
IPO firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware (rather than in their home
state) if the firm is represented by a national rather than a regional law firm.
Not controlling for the source of the start-up's legal advice could bias our re-
sults (Bengtsson 2009). National law firms, for example, may help clients attract
financing from out-of-state investors and advise their clients to incorporate in
Delaware. If so, the observed correlation between out-of-state investors and Del-
aware domicile may not be due to a lingua franca effect but rather to the type of
law firm advising the start-up.2 4
To address this concern, we identify the law firm representing the start-up for
the subsample of 1,022 firms (55 percent of the full sample) where these data are
reported by VX. Working with this subsample of firms, we create a new vari-
able, National Law Firm, which equals one if the law firm is listed by Chambers
USA as a national law firm (elite or highly regarded) in the area of corporate and
mergers and acquisitions practice and zero otherwise.25
We then reestimate equations (1) and (2). For equation (1) we include National
Law Firm as an additional explanatory variable alongside our two treatment vari-
ables and the firm-level controls (model 14). For the reincorporation analysis, we
cannot include National Law Firm as an explanatory variable because it is time
constant. Instead, we estimate two first- difference models, one limited to firms
represented by a national law firm (model 16) and another limited to firms repre-
sented by a regional law firm (model 17).
As in Daines (2002), in the first round of financing, firms represented by a
national law firm are more likely to incorporate in Delaware. Inclusion of this
variable, however, does not change our main findings. The coefficient on Out-of-
State Investors is positive and highly significant (at the 1 percent level) in model
14. Using estimates from model 14, a move from 1 standard deviation below its
mean to 1 standard deviation above its mean results in Out-of-State Investors be-
ing associated with a 17-percentage-point increase (from 65 to 82 percent) in the
' Of course, a national law firm may prefer that all the firms it advises use Delaware law because
Delaware is the only corporate law familiar to all the firm's attorneys. Thus, a finding that start-ups
advised by national law firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware could itself be consistent
with a type of lingua franca effect: one that operates through the start-up's law firm rather than
through the start-up's investors and their attorneys.
" By contrast, Dames (2002) uses the number of IPOs led by each law firm during the period
from 1990 to 2000 as a proxy for whether the law firm is a national firm or a regional firm.
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likelihood of Delaware incorporation, while National Law Firm is associated with
a 6-percentage-point increase (from 71 to 77 percent).
For the reincorporation analysis, we find that AOut-of-State Investors is pos-
itive for both the national law firm and regional law firm subsamples. The rein-
corporation result is significant only for the regional law firm subsample, pre-
sumably because of the small subsample of start-ups represented by national law
firms that were incorporated outside Delaware (n = 114). In any event, our find-
ing of a lingua franca effect appears robust to the type of law firm representing
the start-up.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have put forward and tested a lingua franca explanation for
a firm's decision to domicile in Delaware rather than in its home state: given that
most attorneys are "fluent" in home-state law and Delaware law, a firm raising
financing from in-state and out-of-state investors will choose Delaware to pro-
vide in-state and out-of-state investors a legal language that all can speak. Study-
ing the domicile decisions of 1,850 VC-backed start-ups, we show that the lingua
franca has a significant effect on domicile choices in our sample firms. Indeed, it
is more powerful than other domicile-influencing factors that have been identi-
fied in the literature, such as judicial quality, the flexibility of a state's corporate
law, and the identity of the issuer's attorneys.
Our findings help explain how Delaware has been able to achieve and build on
its dominant position in the market for corporate charters. Its success in attract-
ing new firms is, at least in part, due to investors around the country being rela-
tively more familiar with Delaware corporate law than with the corporate laws of
other states.
Our study also suggests an additional reason why another state may have diffi-
culty competing with Delaware. That state could not succeed without convincing
lawyers to learn a new "language," but the expected benefit to lawyers of learning
a second or third language will be low given that Delaware fluency already allows
a corporate attorney in any state to communicate with most corporate attorneys
in that state and other states. As a result, lawyers will be reluctant to learn a new
language. This lingua franca effect further raises the barrier to competition and
may hinder desirable state-level legal innovation.
Finally, while our study focuses on the domicile choices of private firms, it may
well also have implications for public firms' arrangements. To the extent that
Delaware's dominance in the market for private-firm charters arises because of
investor familiarity, it is likely that Delaware's success in the market for public
firm charters is also not due solely to the inherent features of its corporate law,
network effects, and learning benefits. We hope that our work will be useful to
researchers taking up this question, which has important implications for ascer-
taining the desirability of domicile decisions and the corporate governance of
public firms.
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